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Market power is measured 
by reference to the situation 
where firms compete, that is, 
the number is so high that each 
one earns only a small profit. In 
this case, they shift on the final 
sales price any variation in their 
manufacturing costs so as not 
to reduce their low profit mar-
gins. When cost variations do 
not translate into price changes, 
it is because they have prefer-
red to reduce their profit mar-
gins. When the State increases 
tobacco taxes, manufacturers 
may decide to consider addi-
tional tax revenues as an in-
crease in their costs and lower 
their profit rather than increase 
their selling price so as not to 
discourage the consumer. This 
ability to control prices so as 
not to vary the quantities of ci-
garettes sold is measured by 
the price elasticity of demand, 
that is, the sensitivity of de-
mand to price changes. The re-
sidual demand method is used 
to determine this elasticity for 
the two tobacco companies in 
Senegal.
Data on quantities and prices 
of cigarettes come from the 
National Agency for Demo-
graphy and Statistics (ANSD) 
and the General Directorate of 
Taxes and Customs (DGID) of 
Senegal. They cover the period 
2007-2012..
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INTRODUCTION 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) adopted a new directive on the 
taxation of tobacco products in December 2017. The minimum rate of the ad valorem tax is now set 
at 50% with the removal of restrictions on the maximum rate level to be applied. A specific tax of 
US $ 0.02 per sticks of cigarette is associated with it. These provisions should allow a reduction in 
consumption through an increase in the selling prices of cigarettes. However, the success of such a 
reform will depend on the market power of the tobacco industry, i.e. its ability to decide whether or 
not to shift the tax increases on the sales price. In order to inform the political decision-making on 
this power that the tobacco industry can hold, CRES conducted a research entitled «Market power 
of the tobacco industry in Senegal». This policy brief reports the main results that emerged.
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Figure1: MTOA and Philip Morris’s ability to vary price as a result of a 1% change in demand
Figure 2 shows the results of the analysis of the 
possibility of the two companies agreeing to de-
cide the price level. These results show that none 
of them has an interest in making an agreement 
to set prices. Indeed, if we compare the results 
obtained under the assumption of an agreement 
to that obtained without agreement, we see that 
the MTOA, which had the capacity to lower its 
price level up to 11% when the demand varies 
from 1 %, can only lower this price by 4%. As for 
Philip Morris, the cartel allows him only 3% of 
price decrease not to suffer a decrease of pro-
fit when the demand decreases of 1%, whereas 
it had the possibility of increasing its price fol-
lowing a decrease demand.
RESULTS
The results in Figure 1 show that comparing 
MTOA and Philip Morris to firms operating in a 
competitive market shows that they have mar-
ket power. Indeed, if MTOA wishes to increase 
the demand for its products by 1%, it can do so 
by reducing its price by more than 11% while 
maintaining profit at the level that would have 
obtained a competing company. As for Phillip 
Morris, it has the possibility even to increase its 
price of 6% and to know an increase of its de-
mand of 1%.
The opposite directions of price change as de-
mand increases is explained by the difference 
between the categories of cigarettes produced 
sold by the two firms. Indeed, over the period of 
the study, Philip Morris produced premium brand 
cigarettes while MTOA production was more 
oriented towards cheaper brand cigarettes. Pre-
mium brand cigarettes are consumed by indivi-
duals less sensitive to price changes while chea-
per brand cigarettes are purchased by the least 
affluent consumers.
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Figure 2 : MTOA and Philip Morris’s ability to vary price following a 1% change in demand if there is an agreement 
between the two companies
MAIN LESSONS LEARNT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
 Main lessons
1) The first lesson relates to the weak market power of the two tobacco factories in Senegal. 
Higher power could be expected given their small numbers and addiction to cigarette smoking. 
Indeed, the greater ability to set a price higher than that of competition is only 11%. This 
information reflects the possibility of using taxes to raise prices. If the factory is facing a sharp 
increase in taxes, it will be forced to shift them on the selling price.
2) The second lesson is that the market power is different depending on whether the manufacture 
produces premium brand cigarettes or produces cheaper brand cigarettes. Philip Morris 
producing premium brand cigarettes sees its demand increase when its price increases 
while it is the opposite for the MTOA that produces cheaper brand cigarettes. If the tax rates 
applied to cigarettes are differentiated according to their category, their consequences will be 
different in terms of price increases. Lower taxes on cheaper brand cigarettes provide real 
opportunities for the industry not to shift tax increases on retail prices.
 Recommendations
The results of this research and the lessons that flow from it call for the following recommendation.
- Significantly increase taxes on tobacco products to discourage consumption given that the 
industry’s power not to shift taxes on retail price is low.
4
The International Development Research Center (IDRC) has funded the 
Consortium for Economic and Social Research (CRES) for the second phase 
of its research project on the taxation of tobacco products. One of the objectives 
of this phase was to make the diagnosis of the tax system that the ECOWAS 
countries apply to tobacco products.
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